"... the proposition "God is a being" itself appears as an idol, because it only returns the aim that, in advance, decides that every possible 'God', present or absent, in one way or another, has to be... But is it self-evident that God should have to be, hence to be as a being (supreme, plural - however one wants) in order to give himself as God?
But what indeed can permit and promise the attempt at a thinking of God without and outside of ontological difference? Indeed, to think outside of ontological difference eventually condemns one to be no longer able to think at all. But precisely, to be no longer able to think, when it is a question of God, indicates neither absurdity nor impropriety... By definition and decision, God, if he must be thought, can meet no theoretical space to his measure, because his measure exerts itself in our eyes as an excessiveness. Ontological difference itself, and hence also Being, become too limited..."