Last time, I provided an overview of the first chapter in William Abraham's book, "Crossing the Threshold of Divine Revelation." There, he offers an outline of what he considers to be the standard strategies employed by Christian scholars attempting to develop an epistemology for their beliefs. Abraham is not content with any of the options he finds, and intends to offer an alternative perspective. In Chapter 2 of "Crossing the Threshold...", he begins to sketch his alternative epistemological vision.
First, Abraham is very adamant that we must do all that we can to resist both the desire to develop a full-blown systematic theory of knowledge (p. 24) and the temptation to become relativists or skeptics. (p. 25) He does not believe modern hermeneutical attempts will be epistemologically successful, because in the end, if theology is subjected to hermeneutical inquiry, it will lead to skepticism, since it becomes a process that "is unstable... thoroughly dependent upon the reader... necessarily incomplete, and permanently revisable." (p. 26)
What Abraham is saying here is simply an echo of his previous assertion that no epistemological theory can supersede our theology. And while his statement is valid, it also seems important to remember that all of our beliefs are, at some level, an interpretation of reality. This recognition does not automatically necessitate skepticism. It is merely a reminder of the limits of our knowledge. Abraham would certainly agree, and the struggle he describes is a vital warning to theologians about the danger of relying exclusively upon any system of knowledge.
But Abraham's main goal in Chapter 2 is to provide a series of "epistemic platitudes," statements that are not worked out logically in the situation, but rest upon epistemological foundations that have been previously established as "relatively secure." (p. 29) Abraham does not see any reason why theologians should be less obliged to use a variety of epistemic tools than scholars in any other field of inquiry. Just as historians and scientists can rely upon everything from empirical evidence and cumulative case arguments to "hunches" and "intuitions" (p. 28) so too can theologians. Abraham places before us his 'tool box' (if you will) of epistemic options under the umbrella category of epistemic platitudes.
'Appropriate epistemic fit' is one of these platitudes. Others include: "We can and should accept the general reliability of our senses...", "We should also rely on memory," "We can and should accept testimony, "Some of our beliefs are rightly and properly basic," and so on. (p. 36-38) Now, I have no wish to discredit Abraham with regard to his description of the epistemic platitudes; in fact, I think his approach here is quite valuable. But it does raise several interesting questions, not the least of which is this: Where does all this get us? Is it merely question begging, or is it genuinely beneficial to Christian theology?
I want to pursue this query by looking specifically at one of Abraham's platitudes: "Particularism is to be preferred to methodism." (p. 30) Here, Abraham does not mean denominational Methodism; rather, he is describing once again the tendency in both philosophers and theologians to create a "method" that will serve as a universal epistemological system. He explains in some detail why this statement deserves to be included in his list of platitudes. First, methodism results in an epistemological stalemate between competing methods. This happened with rationalism and empiricism until Kant finally broke the deadlock by creating an entirely new method - which soon fell prey to the same dilemma as Hegel created his system in response.
Second, as more and more methods have developed, epistemology has become "person-relative" - that is, we have so many methods that any theorist can claim their method is valid, and then we are stuck trying to discern which methods are in fact valid, and are once again tempted to start looking for our own method which will break through the impasse. This, of course, is a perpetuation of skepticism, since we can never get to THE method that will finally prove impenetrable.
Abraham's call to particularism alleviates the maddening search for a perfect method by shifting the focus: Instead of trying to pacify the skeptic and defend this or that method, the theologian or philosopher focusing on specific epistemological claims, and soon realizes that she/he really does have a wealth of knowledge upon which to rely. This realization frees them to examine this host of epistemological questions using the variety of tools (the platitudes) available in the epistemic tool box.
As much as I appreciate Abraham's philosophical vision here, I am left with the concern that what the particularist approach leads us to is a distant desert oasis that, upon arrival, proves to be a mirage. What I mean is this: Is it not the case that each of the epistemic platitudes leads to series of philosophical questions that can be questioned? Are not many of them still unresolved? Isn't the problem precisely determining how much we actually know? Abraham seems, many times, to concede that there will be many unanswered questions, and he appears to be content with that reality. But here he is much closer to Barth than he seems willing to admit, at least in the present text.
For, choosing to believe in Christian theology in the face of a series of irresolvable epistemic issues is precisely where faith comes into play. The only major difference I can see here between Abraham and Barth is in the amount of epistemic issues each one is willing to accept as irresolvable before leaping entirely into faith.
Additionally, might not the desire to build upon a series of epistemic platitudes eventually reveal itself to be just another system, albeit one with many more twists and turns? Does an approach that leads to 1,000 particular impasses really give us more, in the end, than an approach that leads to a few major methodological impasses?
I realize I'm sounding here exactly like the skeptic which so frustrates Abraham; it is not my intention to write off his approach, because I do in fact see much value in appropriating the various platitudes. I'm just not sure that at the end of the day what Abraham is doing is really providing an endless series of distractions from the fact that we are really still dealing with a series of impasses. And if, in fact, it is a distraction, then it is a methodological distraction, I think. (Though, I'm open to correction here, if I'm misunderstanding!)
Nevertheless, I am in full agreement with Abraham on this point: We need to abandon the assumption that there is a "network of canonized or constitutive epistemological commitments [which are] essential to one's theism..." (p. 42) This is vital for theology - we are much better off if we hold loosely to our methods and systems and attempt to deal with questions of knowledge as they arise using the epistemic tools best suited to that particular situation. Our primary source of truth is faith, and we must take care not to replace our faith in Christ with a method for ascertaining truth. None of them will take us far enough.
Up next... chapter three!
Thursday, July 16, 2009
Sunday, July 12, 2009
Crossing the Threshold of Divine Revelation, Pt. 1...
Ok... here we go!
In chapter 1 of "Crossing the Threshold...", William Abraham begins his discussion of divine revelation by laying out the basic structure to, and reasoning for, his epistemological approach. Of course, it is a truism that there are many competing claims to revelation. So what makes the Christian claim to revelation worth taking seriously? Abraham states that, throughout the 20th century, three general theological responses to revelation were developed (p. 2-4) in this regard.
First, there is the "conservative" response, that is, the first-order belief that God's revelation is clearly present in Scripture (primarily) - and so the two-fold goal is simply to defend that presupposed revelation from attacks and harmonize any conflicting claims in light of what Scripture already says.
Second, there is what might be called the fideist response of Karl Barth and others, who, according to Abraham, "outlawed the very idea of providing any kind of rational defense for the identification of divine revelation." (p. 3) While I think this is an overstated misrepresentation of Barth's views, since Abraham does not directly engage Barth in the present text, I will leave that issue for another time. Clearly, though, Abraham does not find this approach valuable, calling it "a disaster" (p. 3) because it leaves theologians with no way to properly address the opposition. I think his outright dismissal of the Barthian approach ultimately is unhelpful to his own case; the reader will have to judge for herself whether this is so.
Thirdly, says Abraham, there is what essentially amounts to the response of ignorance or avoidance: some theologians focus on other issues - tacitly accepting skepticism - and avoid dealing with the question of revelation altogether, or turn it into a footnote that needs no serious discussion. This is not only present in some streams of theology but is very prevalent in philosophy, which should not be a surprise.
Against these three responses to revelation, Abraham intends to argue 1) that divine revelation does, in fact, exist and 2) that "our possession of such revelation constitutes knowledge" that is rational and justified. (p. 5) Of course, these are two major theses that must be pursued in connection with other theological and epistemological claims. So, his first step in this direction involves "clearing the decks" (p. 5), that is, pointing out flaws in the current epistemological approaches to theology. Once we realize that the current models are insufficient, he hopes to offer his model as a preferred option.
Having essentially disregarded the second and third responses (fideism and avoidance) from the outset, Abraham presents the "standard strategy" which is used to establish any sort of rational belief in God. (p. 6) This strategy typically finds a general theory of knowledge/thought, develops that theory, and then applies it to belief in God. Examples of this strategy include the classical theological "deductive proofs," the justification of "ultimate language games," establishing a "universal human experience" and/or perception + testimony, the formulation of "cumulative case arguments (whereby belief in God is deemed rational once the total amount of positive evidence outweighs the total negative evidence)," and warrant (in which belief in God rests upon beliefs which are properly basic, making it rationally warranted. This approach has gained wide recognition due to Alvin Plantinga, perhaps the greatest living Christian philosopher.) (p. 7-8)
It is not that Abraham finds these approaches necessarily incorrect or useless. In fact, as we will see, he makes use of many of them within his own epistemological approach. But his real disagreement is with the priority given to the general theory, which - he suggests - results in the subordination of theology to some particular epistemological approach which determines theistic viability. (Ironically, Abraham - as I'm sure he is aware - is sounding quite a bit like Barth at this point!)
In addition to leaving theology open to criticism from a supposedly superior epistemological theory, the standard approach also generally fails to be directly related to the core Christian beliefs, which Abraham prefers to call Canonical theism. In other words, all of these theories may provide some evidence for theism, but none of them can tell me whether I should place my trust in Jesus Christ, the second person of the Trinity, as the Savior of humanity. Abraham also points out that the standard strategy doesn't seem to really fit with the epistemological commitments that Christian believers actually make when they decide to follow Christ. He suggests that we not blithely toss aside these commitments merely because they seem to lack sense within a particular systemic approach.
Because of these problems, Abraham asserts that Christian theologians (and believers in general) ought to adopt "a very different epistemological principle... the principle of appropriate epistemic fit." (p. 11, emphasis mine) Essentially, this amounts to a move from deductive to inductive reasoning, although this is an admitted oversimplification. Rather than beginning with a general theory to which belief in God is subjected, we begin with a specific belief and see what a fresh appraisal of that belief might look like. Then, once the particulars have been assessed, we might be able to see a picture of proper theism as an outworking of our specific beliefs.
According to Abraham, what he is proposing is a simple reversal, which is more in keeping with the way our thinking naturally proceeds. (p. 13) So, he will attempt to take a particular type of theism - the aforementioned Canonical theism - and apply a series of epistemological approaches to it, in an effort to secure a better understanding of its rationality or lack thereof. This avoids the reduction of belief to some general theistic model, and it offers the possibility of working with various epistemic theories rather than relying upon just one.
Note: Abraham does make clear that Canonical theism should not be viewed as some sort of dogmatic set of principles, rather, it is simply a series of theses that refer to the set of beliefs which have traditionally been the "canonical heritage" of the Church. The Church has never canonized any theory of knowledge. (p. 16) This is well worth remembering.
Because there is no canonized theory of knowledge, the Christian believer (Canonical theist) has a wide array of resources to which they may appeal when developing an epistemological response to inquiries about the rationality of their beliefs. Abraham states that most Christians do not have a developed theory of knowledge, and there is no need for one - people can make rational statements about any number of beliefs without having to appeal to some overarching theory. (p. 18) In fact, says Abraham, the various attempts to canonize epistemological theories have been the source of many schisms within the history of the Church. (p. 19-20)
However, in spite of Abraham's correct assertion that epistemology is not a theological, but a philosophical, sub-discipline, the fact remains that we are all - believers and unbelievers alike - heirs of Descartes, Kant, etc., and the subjective turn within philosophy now affects us all, such that we cannot help but ask questions of knowledge and truth, because we are oriented such that those questions are now understood to directly affect me. This is not a criticism of Abraham; it is simply a statement about our understanding of reality as it now stands. So, epistemology clearly remains vital for us, even if it is not a primary theological category.
So, to sum up this post, Abraham rejects the need for any "divinely authorized" theory of knowledge. This does not mean that Christian theologians have no need of epistemology. Rather, Abraham wishes to "relocate the appeal to divine revelation within a wider vision of the epistemology of theology." (p. 23) This vision highlights the mistake of relying upon any overarching system, and begins with the specific form of Canonical theism, to which a variety of epistemic approaches will be applied. In the next post, we will encounter some of those approaches, and see how Abraham responds to those skeptical of his reversal of the standard approach.
In chapter 1 of "Crossing the Threshold...", William Abraham begins his discussion of divine revelation by laying out the basic structure to, and reasoning for, his epistemological approach. Of course, it is a truism that there are many competing claims to revelation. So what makes the Christian claim to revelation worth taking seriously? Abraham states that, throughout the 20th century, three general theological responses to revelation were developed (p. 2-4) in this regard.
First, there is the "conservative" response, that is, the first-order belief that God's revelation is clearly present in Scripture (primarily) - and so the two-fold goal is simply to defend that presupposed revelation from attacks and harmonize any conflicting claims in light of what Scripture already says.
Second, there is what might be called the fideist response of Karl Barth and others, who, according to Abraham, "outlawed the very idea of providing any kind of rational defense for the identification of divine revelation." (p. 3) While I think this is an overstated misrepresentation of Barth's views, since Abraham does not directly engage Barth in the present text, I will leave that issue for another time. Clearly, though, Abraham does not find this approach valuable, calling it "a disaster" (p. 3) because it leaves theologians with no way to properly address the opposition. I think his outright dismissal of the Barthian approach ultimately is unhelpful to his own case; the reader will have to judge for herself whether this is so.
Thirdly, says Abraham, there is what essentially amounts to the response of ignorance or avoidance: some theologians focus on other issues - tacitly accepting skepticism - and avoid dealing with the question of revelation altogether, or turn it into a footnote that needs no serious discussion. This is not only present in some streams of theology but is very prevalent in philosophy, which should not be a surprise.
Against these three responses to revelation, Abraham intends to argue 1) that divine revelation does, in fact, exist and 2) that "our possession of such revelation constitutes knowledge" that is rational and justified. (p. 5) Of course, these are two major theses that must be pursued in connection with other theological and epistemological claims. So, his first step in this direction involves "clearing the decks" (p. 5), that is, pointing out flaws in the current epistemological approaches to theology. Once we realize that the current models are insufficient, he hopes to offer his model as a preferred option.
Having essentially disregarded the second and third responses (fideism and avoidance) from the outset, Abraham presents the "standard strategy" which is used to establish any sort of rational belief in God. (p. 6) This strategy typically finds a general theory of knowledge/thought, develops that theory, and then applies it to belief in God. Examples of this strategy include the classical theological "deductive proofs," the justification of "ultimate language games," establishing a "universal human experience" and/or perception + testimony, the formulation of "cumulative case arguments (whereby belief in God is deemed rational once the total amount of positive evidence outweighs the total negative evidence)," and warrant (in which belief in God rests upon beliefs which are properly basic, making it rationally warranted. This approach has gained wide recognition due to Alvin Plantinga, perhaps the greatest living Christian philosopher.) (p. 7-8)
It is not that Abraham finds these approaches necessarily incorrect or useless. In fact, as we will see, he makes use of many of them within his own epistemological approach. But his real disagreement is with the priority given to the general theory, which - he suggests - results in the subordination of theology to some particular epistemological approach which determines theistic viability. (Ironically, Abraham - as I'm sure he is aware - is sounding quite a bit like Barth at this point!)
In addition to leaving theology open to criticism from a supposedly superior epistemological theory, the standard approach also generally fails to be directly related to the core Christian beliefs, which Abraham prefers to call Canonical theism. In other words, all of these theories may provide some evidence for theism, but none of them can tell me whether I should place my trust in Jesus Christ, the second person of the Trinity, as the Savior of humanity. Abraham also points out that the standard strategy doesn't seem to really fit with the epistemological commitments that Christian believers actually make when they decide to follow Christ. He suggests that we not blithely toss aside these commitments merely because they seem to lack sense within a particular systemic approach.
Because of these problems, Abraham asserts that Christian theologians (and believers in general) ought to adopt "a very different epistemological principle... the principle of appropriate epistemic fit." (p. 11, emphasis mine) Essentially, this amounts to a move from deductive to inductive reasoning, although this is an admitted oversimplification. Rather than beginning with a general theory to which belief in God is subjected, we begin with a specific belief and see what a fresh appraisal of that belief might look like. Then, once the particulars have been assessed, we might be able to see a picture of proper theism as an outworking of our specific beliefs.
According to Abraham, what he is proposing is a simple reversal, which is more in keeping with the way our thinking naturally proceeds. (p. 13) So, he will attempt to take a particular type of theism - the aforementioned Canonical theism - and apply a series of epistemological approaches to it, in an effort to secure a better understanding of its rationality or lack thereof. This avoids the reduction of belief to some general theistic model, and it offers the possibility of working with various epistemic theories rather than relying upon just one.
Note: Abraham does make clear that Canonical theism should not be viewed as some sort of dogmatic set of principles, rather, it is simply a series of theses that refer to the set of beliefs which have traditionally been the "canonical heritage" of the Church. The Church has never canonized any theory of knowledge. (p. 16) This is well worth remembering.
Because there is no canonized theory of knowledge, the Christian believer (Canonical theist) has a wide array of resources to which they may appeal when developing an epistemological response to inquiries about the rationality of their beliefs. Abraham states that most Christians do not have a developed theory of knowledge, and there is no need for one - people can make rational statements about any number of beliefs without having to appeal to some overarching theory. (p. 18) In fact, says Abraham, the various attempts to canonize epistemological theories have been the source of many schisms within the history of the Church. (p. 19-20)
However, in spite of Abraham's correct assertion that epistemology is not a theological, but a philosophical, sub-discipline, the fact remains that we are all - believers and unbelievers alike - heirs of Descartes, Kant, etc., and the subjective turn within philosophy now affects us all, such that we cannot help but ask questions of knowledge and truth, because we are oriented such that those questions are now understood to directly affect me. This is not a criticism of Abraham; it is simply a statement about our understanding of reality as it now stands. So, epistemology clearly remains vital for us, even if it is not a primary theological category.
So, to sum up this post, Abraham rejects the need for any "divinely authorized" theory of knowledge. This does not mean that Christian theologians have no need of epistemology. Rather, Abraham wishes to "relocate the appeal to divine revelation within a wider vision of the epistemology of theology." (p. 23) This vision highlights the mistake of relying upon any overarching system, and begins with the specific form of Canonical theism, to which a variety of epistemic approaches will be applied. In the next post, we will encounter some of those approaches, and see how Abraham responds to those skeptical of his reversal of the standard approach.
Friday, July 10, 2009
William Abraham's "Crossing the Threshold of Divine Revelation"...
So, I'm TA'ing an ethics class next week and have other stuff to work on as well, but...
I just finished reading "Crossing the Threshold of Divine Revelation" by William Abraham, a professor of theology at Southern Methodist University, and I have felt the urge to engage with the text and respond to his approach. So, for the next several posts, I'll be commenting on the book, and some of the language may get a bit technical. I apologize for any irritation this may cause to my readers! :-) At any rate, I begin with an introduction to the book, and to Prof. Abraham, for those who may not be familiar with his work.
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William Abraham is the Albert Cook Outler Professor of Theology and Wesley Studies at Perkins School of Theology, Southern Methodist University, in Dallas, TX. He has written several valuable books, the most well-known probably being "Canon and Criterion in Christian Theology." He is also the primary proponent of what he calls "Canonical theism," which he says "is a term invented to capture the robust form of theism manifested, lived, and expressed in the canonical heritage of the Church. It is proposed as both a living form of theism and a substantial theological experiment for today." (Visit the above link for a more complete account of Canonical theism.)
It was actually my discovery of the online overview of Canonical theism that led me to Abraham's work. Upon discovering that he is also very interested in the intersection between philosophy and theology (particularly epistemology, the study of knowledge and how we know things), I decided that it might be helpful - and fun! - to read one of his primary texts and find out, among other things, whether he and I might share similar academic interests and ideas. As we will see, the answer to that question is both 'yes' and 'no.' It was with this basic background that I picked up a copy of "Crossing the Threshold of Divine Revelation."
Essentially, "Crossing the Threshold..." is a treatise on a particular type of religious epistemology (from a Christian perspective, naturally). In the preface, Abraham explains that one of his goals in writing the book was to provide theologians with details about "recent developments within epistemology," (p. xi) and to provide philosophers with a novel analytic treatment of divine revelation.
[Side note: Another reason for my interest in Abraham's work is that he is a thinker in the Anglo-American tradition of "analytical philosophy" who actually seems to be friendly with those thinkers in the "continental philosophy" camp, which is where I tend to resonate. It's always good to be in dialogue with those who approach things from a different angle or methodology.]
At its center, this epistemological approach to revelation is tied to the goal of making Canonical theism both tenable and approachable. As I have not read "Canon and Criterion...", and I am not primarily concerned here with Canonical theism, I will keep my comments concerning that arena to a minimum. Instead, I intend to explore some of Abraham's epistemological claims concerning divine revelation, and respond to what I take to be the strengths and weaknesses of his assertions. With any luck, all of us will understand a bit more about epistemology and divine revelation when I am done!
So, with this introduction in place, my next post will be a response to chapter one. Hope you enjoy this series. If not, I take all the blame! :-)
I just finished reading "Crossing the Threshold of Divine Revelation" by William Abraham, a professor of theology at Southern Methodist University, and I have felt the urge to engage with the text and respond to his approach. So, for the next several posts, I'll be commenting on the book, and some of the language may get a bit technical. I apologize for any irritation this may cause to my readers! :-) At any rate, I begin with an introduction to the book, and to Prof. Abraham, for those who may not be familiar with his work.
-------
William Abraham is the Albert Cook Outler Professor of Theology and Wesley Studies at Perkins School of Theology, Southern Methodist University, in Dallas, TX. He has written several valuable books, the most well-known probably being "Canon and Criterion in Christian Theology." He is also the primary proponent of what he calls "Canonical theism," which he says "is a term invented to capture the robust form of theism manifested, lived, and expressed in the canonical heritage of the Church. It is proposed as both a living form of theism and a substantial theological experiment for today." (Visit the above link for a more complete account of Canonical theism.)
It was actually my discovery of the online overview of Canonical theism that led me to Abraham's work. Upon discovering that he is also very interested in the intersection between philosophy and theology (particularly epistemology, the study of knowledge and how we know things), I decided that it might be helpful - and fun! - to read one of his primary texts and find out, among other things, whether he and I might share similar academic interests and ideas. As we will see, the answer to that question is both 'yes' and 'no.' It was with this basic background that I picked up a copy of "Crossing the Threshold of Divine Revelation."
Essentially, "Crossing the Threshold..." is a treatise on a particular type of religious epistemology (from a Christian perspective, naturally). In the preface, Abraham explains that one of his goals in writing the book was to provide theologians with details about "recent developments within epistemology," (p. xi) and to provide philosophers with a novel analytic treatment of divine revelation.
[Side note: Another reason for my interest in Abraham's work is that he is a thinker in the Anglo-American tradition of "analytical philosophy" who actually seems to be friendly with those thinkers in the "continental philosophy" camp, which is where I tend to resonate. It's always good to be in dialogue with those who approach things from a different angle or methodology.]
At its center, this epistemological approach to revelation is tied to the goal of making Canonical theism both tenable and approachable. As I have not read "Canon and Criterion...", and I am not primarily concerned here with Canonical theism, I will keep my comments concerning that arena to a minimum. Instead, I intend to explore some of Abraham's epistemological claims concerning divine revelation, and respond to what I take to be the strengths and weaknesses of his assertions. With any luck, all of us will understand a bit more about epistemology and divine revelation when I am done!
So, with this introduction in place, my next post will be a response to chapter one. Hope you enjoy this series. If not, I take all the blame! :-)
Saturday, July 4, 2009
Three principles for interpreting Scripture per Kevin VanHoozer...
While there is, of course, much more that could be said, and much work that needs to be continued, with regard to our interpretation and understanding of Scripture, VanHoozer's outline here seems to be right on:
1. Theological interpretation of Scripture is God-centered biblical interpretation, a way of reading the Bible to hear the Word of God. As such, it is a matter of "first theology," for our doctrine of God affects our view of Scripture and our view of Scripture affects our doctrine of God. All exegesis is governed by presuppositions that are ultimately theological.
2. There is no more important task for the church than theological interpretation of Scripture (because of what this involves), and it is a task that must involve the whole church and the whole seminary (e.g., all the theological disciplines).
3. Theological interpretation of Scripture must involve the whole person (all the "personal disciplines," including the intellectual and the spiritual). It is related to spiritual and intellectual and imaginative formation. Scripture forms the whole person.
1. Theological interpretation of Scripture is God-centered biblical interpretation, a way of reading the Bible to hear the Word of God. As such, it is a matter of "first theology," for our doctrine of God affects our view of Scripture and our view of Scripture affects our doctrine of God. All exegesis is governed by presuppositions that are ultimately theological.
2. There is no more important task for the church than theological interpretation of Scripture (because of what this involves), and it is a task that must involve the whole church and the whole seminary (e.g., all the theological disciplines).
3. Theological interpretation of Scripture must involve the whole person (all the "personal disciplines," including the intellectual and the spiritual). It is related to spiritual and intellectual and imaginative formation. Scripture forms the whole person.
Wednesday, July 1, 2009
Ellul on the tension of living as a Christian...
I think this quote relates to some of the ideas I presented in my last post, and Ellul says it so much more eloquently than I can:
"Henceforth we must give up the idea that we can decrease our sin by our virtues. We must give up believing that we can 'improve' the world, that at least we can make man better, even if we cannot make him happy. At the same time, if we take this situation of the Christian seriously, we must refuse to further the disintegrating tendency in the world. We must not say to ourselves, 'We can't do anything about it!'
Thus we seem caught between two necessities, which nothing can alter: on the one hand it is impossible for us to make this world less sinful; on the other hand it is impossible for us to accept it as it is. If we refuse either the one or the other, we are actually not accepting the situation in which God has placed us... just as we are involved in the tension of sin and grace, so also we are involved in the tension between these two contradictory demands. It is a very painful, and a very uncomfortable, situation, but it is the only position which can be fruitful for the action of the Christian in the world... we must accept this tension and live in it."
"Henceforth we must give up the idea that we can decrease our sin by our virtues. We must give up believing that we can 'improve' the world, that at least we can make man better, even if we cannot make him happy. At the same time, if we take this situation of the Christian seriously, we must refuse to further the disintegrating tendency in the world. We must not say to ourselves, 'We can't do anything about it!'
Thus we seem caught between two necessities, which nothing can alter: on the one hand it is impossible for us to make this world less sinful; on the other hand it is impossible for us to accept it as it is. If we refuse either the one or the other, we are actually not accepting the situation in which God has placed us... just as we are involved in the tension of sin and grace, so also we are involved in the tension between these two contradictory demands. It is a very painful, and a very uncomfortable, situation, but it is the only position which can be fruitful for the action of the Christian in the world... we must accept this tension and live in it."
Thursday, June 25, 2009
Christianity: A "common belief system" basic to America?
Recently, I was sent an online commentary in which the author, radio personality Peter Heck, laments (as many conservative pundits seem to do these days) the apparent loss of America's grounding in the Christian "belief system", and the inevitable degradation of our society which will surely result - if it hasn't already - from such a turning away from our supposed founding principles.
As Heck asserts in his article, "Our Founding Fathers were wise and learned individuals who were students of political philosophy. When crafting the basis for our civilization, they could have chosen any of a number of belief systems, but they chose Christianity for a reason... it was because they understood that the absolute, moral principles that come from Christian scripture – respect for life, private property rights, charity, frugality, stewardship, benevolence, peaceful living, responsible liberty – were the best friend to a free society and should be encouraged."
Now I recognize that, in many ways, our society has become far more morally lenient than we have been in the past, and I agree that this leniency sometimes leads to unfortunate consequences. On the other hand, the status quo has often led to just as many negative ends. Christian virtues alone do not mean a nation will avoid making terrible mistakes.
However, Heck seems unaware of the possibility that such an ethical limit-expansion is precisely the result of the American experiment. For one cannot establish a nation founded on the core principles that "all men are created equal" and "endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable Rights" including "Life, Liberty and the pursuit of Happiness" and that governments must derive "their just powers from the consent of the governed," and reasonably expect the members of that society to stand idly by and ignore what they see as limitations to their own achievement of such aims.
Those who abide by a certain moral guideline may certainly disagree with those who seek to change that guideline - in fact, that is to be expected. However, we live in a nation where it is also expected that, as we grow and change, there will be challenges to the system. Some of these will be accepted by the society at large and some will not. One might choose to lament the loss of a particular moral grounding, but we should hardly be surprised that, in a nation that prizes individual freedom and "unalienable" rights above all else, each of the myriad humans who inhabits our society will seek to have their own rights and freedoms firmly established in both the public and private arenas.
Further - and far more important, in my view - while I am sure that Mr. Heck is well-versed in political theory, I am not convinced he has an equal grasp on the essence of Christian theology.
For the above list of "Christian" virtues, as valuable as they are, are NOT particularly Christian values. In fact, the majority of the world's religions could claim them as their own. (Indeed, even the majority of Muslims, whom Heck seems to set apart as one of the religions who wouldn't be a good foundation for a free nation, would appeal to their own Scriptures in defense of their respect for life, charity, frugality, etc.) No, what separates Christianity and makes it unique is not a list of virtues that can be nationally claimed. Rather, the unique claim of Christianity is that followers of Christ ought to be willing to give up all their rights, not for the sake of a political agenda, but for Christ's kingdom. That is, Christ asks us for an allegiance greater than our allegiance to any nation.
The type of "Christianity" that Mr. Heck longs for is not Christianity at all, but a form of civil religion that is subjected to the all-encompassing American ideals that have made our nation a place of freedom, tolerance, and respect for the rule of law. This political system has many great qualities, to be sure. But being equatable to the Christian faith is not one of them. In fact, it is safe to say that if Christians were to truly follow Christ's teachings and live his Gospel, many more of them would be branded as "enemies of the state." For what nation wants to have as its majority belief system the willingness to lay down one's life for something higher than the safety of the nation?
More to the point, do we really believe that American individualism and the accompanying "pursuit of happiness" would be heralded by Christ as values to which his followers should aspire? And yet, many Americans seem to be unaware of any distinction between the values of our nation and the values of Christ.
Now, of course, this is not a simple either/or dichotomy. It is certainly possible to be a faithful believer in Christ while also living as a productive member of our American society. But while one can, in some circumstances, be dedicated completely to Christ and also live as a faithful American, one cannot be completely dedicated to America and also live as a faithful Christian. Why? Precisely because America is not founded on Christianity. It will often fail to maintain the image of a "Christian nation" which has been foolishly foisted upon it by so many well-meaning Americans.
When America fails to look like a Christian nation, we ought not look to some previous time when we were morally upright, and seek to bring back that era. Rather, we ought to grieve in our idolatry and foolishness, call ourselves to repentance, pray for the healing of our nation, and look to the One who is our true source of hope: not a belief system, but a person -- Jesus Christ.
As Heck asserts in his article, "Our Founding Fathers were wise and learned individuals who were students of political philosophy. When crafting the basis for our civilization, they could have chosen any of a number of belief systems, but they chose Christianity for a reason... it was because they understood that the absolute, moral principles that come from Christian scripture – respect for life, private property rights, charity, frugality, stewardship, benevolence, peaceful living, responsible liberty – were the best friend to a free society and should be encouraged."
Now I recognize that, in many ways, our society has become far more morally lenient than we have been in the past, and I agree that this leniency sometimes leads to unfortunate consequences. On the other hand, the status quo has often led to just as many negative ends. Christian virtues alone do not mean a nation will avoid making terrible mistakes.
However, Heck seems unaware of the possibility that such an ethical limit-expansion is precisely the result of the American experiment. For one cannot establish a nation founded on the core principles that "all men are created equal" and "endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable Rights" including "Life, Liberty and the pursuit of Happiness" and that governments must derive "their just powers from the consent of the governed," and reasonably expect the members of that society to stand idly by and ignore what they see as limitations to their own achievement of such aims.
Those who abide by a certain moral guideline may certainly disagree with those who seek to change that guideline - in fact, that is to be expected. However, we live in a nation where it is also expected that, as we grow and change, there will be challenges to the system. Some of these will be accepted by the society at large and some will not. One might choose to lament the loss of a particular moral grounding, but we should hardly be surprised that, in a nation that prizes individual freedom and "unalienable" rights above all else, each of the myriad humans who inhabits our society will seek to have their own rights and freedoms firmly established in both the public and private arenas.
Further - and far more important, in my view - while I am sure that Mr. Heck is well-versed in political theory, I am not convinced he has an equal grasp on the essence of Christian theology.
For the above list of "Christian" virtues, as valuable as they are, are NOT particularly Christian values. In fact, the majority of the world's religions could claim them as their own. (Indeed, even the majority of Muslims, whom Heck seems to set apart as one of the religions who wouldn't be a good foundation for a free nation, would appeal to their own Scriptures in defense of their respect for life, charity, frugality, etc.) No, what separates Christianity and makes it unique is not a list of virtues that can be nationally claimed. Rather, the unique claim of Christianity is that followers of Christ ought to be willing to give up all their rights, not for the sake of a political agenda, but for Christ's kingdom. That is, Christ asks us for an allegiance greater than our allegiance to any nation.
The type of "Christianity" that Mr. Heck longs for is not Christianity at all, but a form of civil religion that is subjected to the all-encompassing American ideals that have made our nation a place of freedom, tolerance, and respect for the rule of law. This political system has many great qualities, to be sure. But being equatable to the Christian faith is not one of them. In fact, it is safe to say that if Christians were to truly follow Christ's teachings and live his Gospel, many more of them would be branded as "enemies of the state." For what nation wants to have as its majority belief system the willingness to lay down one's life for something higher than the safety of the nation?
More to the point, do we really believe that American individualism and the accompanying "pursuit of happiness" would be heralded by Christ as values to which his followers should aspire? And yet, many Americans seem to be unaware of any distinction between the values of our nation and the values of Christ.
Now, of course, this is not a simple either/or dichotomy. It is certainly possible to be a faithful believer in Christ while also living as a productive member of our American society. But while one can, in some circumstances, be dedicated completely to Christ and also live as a faithful American, one cannot be completely dedicated to America and also live as a faithful Christian. Why? Precisely because America is not founded on Christianity. It will often fail to maintain the image of a "Christian nation" which has been foolishly foisted upon it by so many well-meaning Americans.
When America fails to look like a Christian nation, we ought not look to some previous time when we were morally upright, and seek to bring back that era. Rather, we ought to grieve in our idolatry and foolishness, call ourselves to repentance, pray for the healing of our nation, and look to the One who is our true source of hope: not a belief system, but a person -- Jesus Christ.
Wednesday, June 24, 2009
it wasn't that long ago...
Lest we think that the U.S. is really beyond doing/thinking terrible things, this week we heard recordings of former president Nixon's comments that abortion would be appropriate in the case of "a black and a white." And then, there's this:
http://www.usatoday.com/news/health/2009-06-23-eugenics-carrie-buck_N.htm?csp=24&RM_Exclude=Juno
Always remember that even the country you love is capable of grave sins (even today), and that Christ calls his followers to be citizens of a kingdom that is not like the nations of the earth.
http://www.usatoday.com/news/health/2009-06-23-eugenics-carrie-buck_N.htm?csp=24&RM_Exclude=Juno
Always remember that even the country you love is capable of grave sins (even today), and that Christ calls his followers to be citizens of a kingdom that is not like the nations of the earth.
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